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A. No. 23241. In Bank Jan. 
I10WELL Petitioner v. SUPERIOR COURT OF 
LOS ANGELES 
Contempt--Nature and Source of Court's Power.-Court has 
to offender for direct con-
[2a, 2b] Attorneys-Duties to Court.-An has duty to 
himself in court and continue with 
a trial he has undertaken and not unduly to delay it for any 
.matter reasonably within his control; he must, lack-
valid excuse, be present at all times during trial of case 
in which he is sole counsel for a party, and as oflicer of court 
he is bound to respect and comply with its pertinent and law-
ful orders given in open court in his presence. 
[3] Contempt--Acts Constituting Contempt--Misconduct of At-
torneys.-Attorney's failure to be present in court at an-
nounced hour for resumption of trial in which he is engaged, 
thus interrupting trial and interfering with court proceedings, 
constitutes contempt of court where he has no valid excuse. 
[ 4] Id.-Acts Constituting Contempt--Misconduct of Attorneys.-
Though some weakness or illness may have contributed to 
attorney's failure to appear punctually in court and such mis-
conduct was not deliberately and maliciously planned derelic-
tion of where there appears to have been remissness and 
failure in performance of duty on his part, coupled with ability 
to court is warranted in finding him guilty of con-
tempt. 
[5] Id.-Acts Constituting Contempt--Misconduct of Attorneys.-
Attorney's failure without valid excuse to be present in court 
at announced hour for resumption of trial in which he is en-
constitutes a contempt committed in immediate view 
and presence of court, and hence a direct contempt which court 
is empowered to punish summarily under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1211. 
[6] Id.-Acts Constituting Contempt--Misconduct of Attorneys.-
If attorney's absence with its ensuing interruption of court 
proceedings is occasioned by some cause not reasonably within 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 3; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 40. 
[3] Attorney's failure to attend court or tardiness as contempt, 
note, 59 A.L.R. 1272. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 9 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Contempt, § 11 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Contempt,§ 3; [2] Attorneys,§ 5; 
[3-7] Contempt, § 15; [9] Contempt, § 72. 
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facts to court falls on attorney; 
officer of court who under those circumstances 
[7] Contempt-Misconduct of 
Court is not bound to believe 
that he failed to appear in court 
cause he 
occasions he had 
he should have heen present and when he 
Id.-Nature and Source of Court's Power.-Power to 
cate a direct contempt is of and 
should be exercised with great "' '-'w~·m"' 
[9] !d.-Remission of Punishment.-Whether 
which t<xecution of punishment for direct contempt 
on his failure to attend eourt at announced hour should be 
remitted in whole or in part is question whieh 
quired into by trial court on proper 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
guilty of contempt of court. 
Judgment affirmed. 
A. Brigham Rose for Petitioner. 
Harold \V. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los 
B. Anson, David D. Mix and William E. 
County Counsel, for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-In this certiorari proceeding petitioner 
seeks annulment of an order of 
adjudging him guilty of a direct contempt of court and sen-
tencing him to serve "five 24-hour days" in the county 
vVe have concluded that, contrary to petitioner's contention, 
the court correctly held petitioner's acts to constitute a 
rather than an indirect, contempt, and that the 
should be affirmed. 
The record shows that petitioner was sole counsel for de-
fendant in a felony prosecution entitled People v. Pardini, 
Los Angeles County number 160665. Trial of the case before 
respondent court with a jury commenced on Pebruary 23, 
1954. Petitioner was present at the trial on that and 
on the morning of February 24. At uoon on the 24th the 
7G7 
declarrd consider 
the second time in this identical case 
in eon-
" in the 
Exeention of the sentence was stayed until 
of the criminal trial. 
for annulment pPtitioner urges there was no 
bnt that if any occurred it was indirect, that is, 
1llat it IYas not c-ommitted in the innnediate view and presence 
anr] could therefore be pnnished after affi-
and as provided for in sections 1211, 
aml 1217 of the Code of Civil Proeednre. 
Sretion 1209 of the Code of Civil Procedure der~lares that 
omissions in respect to a court of 
are contrmpts of the authorit.v 
inso1rnt behavior toward thr 
tending to interrupt the due 
c·onrse of 11 trial 
" 
service 
:"'fisbelJavior in or othrr wilfnl nrglrct or vio-
connsrl ... , or other person, 
to perform a judicial or ministerial 
'' DisohPdienee of any lawful . . . order . . . of thr 
eo nrt ; 
nn1awfnl interference with the process or 
a conrt ... '' 
of tl1e Code of Civil Procedure provides that 
shall baye power: L 'ro preserve and enforce 
ordrr in its immediate preRence; 2. To enforce order in the 
before it . 3. To provide for the orderly 
conduct of before it ... ; 5. 'l'o control in fur-
tlwrance of the conduct of its ministerial officers, 
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a 
758 LYoNs v. SuPERIOR CouRT [43 C.2d 
in every matter 
are in substance but restatements 
of principles which have been and enforced since 
the dawn of modern [1] As stated in In re 
Terry (1888), 128 U.S. 289 [9 S.Ct. 32 L.Ed. 405], 
the power to an offender for a direct con-
tempt is, and from ''almost immemorial 
ac<~eptea as an inherent power of courts upon the 
and enforcement of which ' the existence and author-
ity of the tribunals established to the rights of the 
citizen, whether of life, liberty, or and whether 
assailed by the acts of the or the law-
lessness or violence of individuals. It has relation to the class 
of contempts being committed in the face of a court, 
imply a purpose to or impair its authority, to obstruct 
the transaction of its business, or to insult or intimidate those 
charged with the duty of administering the law. Blackstone 
thus states the rule: 'If the contempt be committed in the 
face of the court, the offender may be instantly apprehended 
and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges, without any 
further proof or examination .. .' " (See also Blodgett v. 
Superior Court (1930), 210 CaL 1, 10 [290 P. 293, 72 A.L.R. 
482]; People v. Turner (1850), 1 Cal. 152, 153.) 
[2a] The duty of an attorney punctually to present him-
self in court and diligently to continue with a trial he had 
undertaken and not to unduly delay it for any personal 
matter reasonably within his control is clear; likewise it is 
clear that when an attorney who is the sole counsel appear-
ing for a defendant in a felony case absents himself from 
the trial, he interrupts and effectively blocks, for the period 
of his absence, all proceedings in that trial. The written 
''Commitment on '' made by the court in the pres-
ent case, after reciting the facts as to the pendency of the 
trial, the proceedings therein, petitioner's failure to appear 
in the courtroom until the honr of 2 :45 p.m. and his state-
ment that he had been asleep, continues, ''That said state-
ment was not supported by any evidence or testimony and 
which statement the Court declined to believe. That on not 
less than ten prior occasions the said Lowell Lyons [peti-
tioner] has either been substantially late or wholly failed 
to attend said Court in Department 43 at times when cases 
in which he was counsel of record were set for trial or other 
proceedings when his presence was necessary and that on 
v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
f.43 C.2d 755; 278 P.2d 681] 
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said Lowell was adjudged guilty of 
for to appear in said in a 
was counsel of record and which was set 
a.m. until the hour of 9 :55 a.m. and for 
conduct. 
was sentenced to serve 
,Jail of said County, which 
an admonition against a repe-
IT IS ORDERED Ai:\D ADJUDGED rfhat said Lowell 
of of Court and sentenced to serve 
hours each in the County Jail of 
this County." The factual elements of the commitment above 
set forth are not challenged. 
The commitment order thus establishes that the court con-
cluded that petitioner had had the ability to appear punctually 
at 2 o 'dock and that his :failure or neglect to appear was 
wilful, i.e., with "a purpose or willingness to commit the 
act, or make the omission." (See Pen. Code, § § 7 ( subd. 1) 
and 21; Code Civ. Proc., § 16; In re Trombley (1948), 31 
Cal.2d 807-809 [193 P.2d 734] .) [3] It follows that 
petitioner's failure to be present in court at the announced 
hour for resumption of the trial in which he was engaged, 
thus interrupting the trial and interfering with the court 
proceedings, constituted contempt of court since, as petitioner 
himself and as the court found, he had no valid excuse. 
(Cf. In re JYiackay (19341, 140 CaLApp. 400 [35 P.2d 385]; 
In re JJ1cHugh (1908), 152 Mich. 505 [116 N.W. 459]; 59 
A.L.R. 1272-1273.) [4] Although as hereinafter mentioned 
in relation to another aspect of the case it may be true that 
some weakness or illness contributed in a measure to peti-
tioner's failure to appear pnnctually, and that his misconduct 
was not a deliberately and ma1iciously planned dereliction 
of duty, nevertheless npon the record there appears to have 
been a remissness and failure in performance of duty on 
his part, ',vith ability to perform, which the court 
was warranted in finding to constitute contempt. 
[5] We are likewise satisfied that petitioner's conduct 
eonstituted ''a contempt ... committed in the immediate 
view and presence of the eourt' a direct contempt-
which the court is empowered to punish summarily under 
the provisions of seetion 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
It is clear that the trial and the attorney's participation in 
it are in the court's immediate view and presence and, ob-
viously, petitioner's obstruction of the trial by absenting 
himself from 
presence and 
other conduct him 
[6] in truth, the 
of the court nr,oce:ecinu~'S 
sonably within the 
is but 
burden of 
falls upon the 
the officer of the court who under those 
a of proceeding. 'l'he effect of a 
be to absolve the defaulting from any 
explanation of his absence, no matter how 
repeated, unless the judge takes the burden of 
and instituting formal proceedings. 'l'his would make of 
the judge not a judicial officer carrying out the 
of his office, but a complaining witness in an 
ceeding. Such a rule, we think, would not 
to long established law but would not best serve the admin-
istration of justice. 
It has been directly held in this state that failure of a 
sheriff to produce in court the body of one in his 
(Ex parte Sternes (1888), 77 Cal. 156, 163 P. 275, 11 
Am.St.Rep. 251] ) , or failure of a parent to produce in court 
a minor child of which such parent has (In re Carr 
(1944), 65 Cal.App.2d 681, 685-686 [151 P.2d 164] ), when 
properly ordered so to do, constitutes a direct whieh 
may be summarily punished. On the here material 
the court in the Sternes case said 163 of 77 Cal.) : "The 
failure of Sternes to produce the body of Ah as the 
court found he had the power to do, before the court, in 
obedience to the writ, was a contempt committed in the face 
of the court, and no affidavit of the facts the 
contempt was necessary to give the court knowledge thereof.'' 
In the Carr case the District Court of Appeal quoted from 
and followed the Sternes case. (See also In rc Robb , 
64 Cal. 431 [1 P. 881]; 12 Am.Jur. 390-392.) Manifestly 
an attorney at law, under the circumstances shown here and 
in the absence of a showing to the contrary, may be inferred 
to have at least as much control in respect to presenting or 
absenting himself at court as can a sheriff or parent have 
in relation to producing or sequestering a third person. 
[2b] Likewise manifest, as has already been is the 
duty of an attorney, lacking a valid excuse, to be present at 
Jan. 1955] LYoNs v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
[ 43 C.2d 755; 278 P.2d 681] 
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all times the trial of a case in which he is sole counsel 
for a party, and as an officer of the court he is bound to 
respect and comply with its pertinent and lawful orders 
in open court in his presence. 
It is vigorously urged that the 
imposed upon in this case 
tention that it is unwise to permit the before whom 
a contempt is committed to himself mete out the 
Offutt v. United States (1954), 348 U.S. 11 [75 S.Ct. 
11, 99 L.Ed.* .) This contention, does not 
lead to the conclusion that the sentence in this case is void. 
The record shows that the following took when vc,,u,uw:o< 
finally appeared in the courtroom at 2 :45 p.m.: 
"THE CouRT: The record will show, in this case, that the 
Court took a recess at 12 :00 o'clock p. m.; that everybody was 
here at the hour o£ 2:00 o'clock except defense counsel, Lowell 
Lyons, who has just appeared here at a quarter of 3 :00. 
''The Court at 2 :35 issued a warrant for the apprehension 
of the said counsel, but counsel appeared before the warrant 
was served. 
"The Court finds that cause exists for issuing the warrant, 
and that the defendant's counsel should show cause why he 
should not be punished for contempt. 
''MR. J_,voNs : May I be heard at this time 1 
''THE CoURT: Yes. 
"MR. LYONS: Yes. At this time, if your Honor pleases, I 
would like to point ont that I did intend to be here at 2 :00 
o'clock. I was across the street in my office. 
''Actually, I have no excuse, because I was asleep. I just 
awoke. I have had a very bad cold. I overslept an hour. 
''I had left word with the answering service in my office 
to call me at a quarter to 2 :00. They said they did. Ap-
parently I didn't hear, your Honor. 
"I didn't get too much sleep last night. Apparently I 
Heeded sleep. I overslept for that reason. 
''I know of no other reason, your Honor. There was no 
cause preventing me from appearing other than the fact I 
was asleep in my office. 
"Those are the facts. I have been there all the time. I 
just awoke, and I came over immediately. 
''THE CouRT: I don't consider that an excuse. 
"This is the second time in this identical case that you've 
done the same thing. 
*L.Ed.Adv.Opn.: Page 7. 
762 LYoNs v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
that's 




"THE CouRT: No reason you shouldn't be here. 
''In the former we the same 
and we took a recess in the and after the recess you 
had and couldn't be found on the floor 
anywhere; and after some time you showed 
up without offering any excuse. 
' vs. that was on September 2, 1953, the 
case was on the trial calendar and you failed to show up 
at any time that day. We discovered that you were 
trying a case in the Municipal Court. 
"There are a num her of instances of your being late, failing 
to be present at a time when you should be present. And on 
October 27 of 1953, we had a case of People vs. Streeter which 
went over to OetobPr- 28 at 9 :80. You were not preS('Ilt. An 
effort was made to locate you unsuccessfully. You finally 
showed up at 9 :55 at your place at eounsel table and made no 
excuse or explanation. You were informed you vvere in eon-
tempt of eourt, and the Court at that time found you in 
contempt. 
''This has been such a chronie, habitual situation, the 
Court finds that you are now in contempt. 
"It is the judgment and sentence of this Court for said 
contempt you be imprisoned in the County ,Jail for five 24-
hour days.'' 
[7] As expressly stated in the commitment the court did 
not-and it was not bound to-believe petitioner's unsworn 
statement that he fail(~d to appear at the appointed hour for 
resumption of the trial because he had been asleep. Neverthe-
less, the very character and extent of petitioner's derelictions 
as found in the commitment seem to indieate that perhaps his 
misconduct may have been contributed to by illness of some 
form. "Whether such misconduct was on the one hand de-
liberately and malieionsly calculated or, on the other hand was 
materially contributed to by illness or other mitigating condi-
tion, is a matter of substantial moment to the petitioner and 
to the court. [8] As carefully pointed out by this court 
when it first gave consideration to the subject (People v. 
Turner (1850), supra, 1 Cal. 152, 158) and as has never been 
doubted, the power to adjudicate a direct contempt ''is neces-
sarily of an arbitrary nature, and should be used with great 
prudence and caution. A judge should bear in mind that he is 
,Jan. LYONS v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
[43 C.2d 755; 278 P.2d 6811 
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not so much in vinili<·at his own as in 
the due to the administration of the laws; 
:cmd this consideration should induce him to receive as satis-
factory any reason a hle for an offender's conduct." 
even whrre the finding of appears essen-
tial to the proper conduct of the court's business no class of 
nffense O(:curs to us in \Yhich the court should more readily 
search out and effect to mitigating circumstances than in 
eases of direct contempts. [9] 'Whether grounds exist upon 
which execution of the punishment here imposed should be 
rmnitted in whole or in part is a question which can be in-
into by the trial court on a proper application by peti-
tioner. (See City of Vernon v. Cottrt (1952), 38 
Cal. 2d 50!), 520 [ 241 P .2d 243] ; City Vernon v. 
Uourl ( , B9 Cal.2d 8:39, 843 [250 P.2d .) 
l''or the reasons above stated, tlw judgment of contempt 
is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Edmonds, ,J ., and Spenee, ,J ., eoneurred. 
CAHTEH, J .-I dissent. 
l agree that the failure of an attorney to attend court 
at the appointed time for trial of a criminal case, when he 
is representing a client whose case is being tried, may be 
eontempt of court if he has no valid exeuse and the judicial 
processes are obstrm,ted. (ICx parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121 [106 
S.W. 990, 15 L.RA.N.S. 389]; In re McHugh, 152 Mich. 505 
1116 N.W. 45UJ; Wise v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 779 [34 
S.E. 458]; People v. McDonnell, 307 Ill.App. :368 [30 N.E.2d 
80 J, affirmed 377 IlL 568 [37 N.E.2d 159) ; Nelson v. Werg-
land, 104 N.J.Eq. 334 [146 A. 32j; Vincent v. Vincent, 108 
"\L,J.Eq. 136 [154 A. 328] ; Appea1 of Levine, 372 Pa. 612 [95 
A.2d 222]; Klein v. United States, 151 F.2d 286 [80 App. D.C. 
106]; see In r·e Walker, 275 App.Div. 688 [86 N.Y.S.2d 726]; 
In re Mackay, 140 Cal.App. 400 [35 P.2d 385]; Sellers v. 
Whaley, 84 Ga.App. 715 [67 S.E.2d 241].) However, I 
cannot conceive how such contempt would be direct. rl'he 
statute specifically requires that for a contempt to be direct 
it must involve conduct in the "irnrnecliate view and presence 
of the court" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211). Sueh eon tempt may 
be punished summarily beeause the conduct eoncerned, and 
all of it, took place where the court heard and saw it, hence 
the court is in a position to act summarily, as all the facts 
involved are within his cognizance, and there exists a need 
SuPERJOR Comt•r C.2d 
r~ontinunnee of aetions which 
and obstrud the judieial 
JH'oce:ss. do not exist. The only faet 
that tht~ t•IJI!l't knew about was tlmt petitioner did not appear 
tlw trial. J t did not know whether that failure \Yas due 
lo cin·Hm;.;taJwe:~ tiouer eontrol or waN inex-
''l!:sabk t IJt' wilfal rd'usal to attt~lld the trial. \Vithout 
thost' all of whil'h ot:cllrl'ed away from the eourt, and 
out of its Land it \nls nut iu a positio11 to ast:er-
whether tlwre was eontempt. 
The opinion Ita:.; little to say upon this subjed 
to express its firm belief that petitimter was guilty ui 
It says: "The latter, not the judge, is the officer 
td: the t:onrt who nnder those eirc:nmstances owes a duty of 
'l'ht: eJfeet of a eontrary holding would be to 
ab;:;ol n• the dd'aul ti ng attorney from any burden of cxplana-
t ion of hi;; no matter how flagrant and often repeated, 
unles::; the 1akes the burden of filing a charge and in-
:stitutillg formal proceedings. This would make of the judge 
not a judieial offiecr earryiug out the re~ponsibilities of his 
oiliec, but a eomplaining witness in an aflYersary proeeeding. 
Snl'h a rule, we think, would not only be c'ontrary to long es· 
taiJlis!Jed law but wonld not best serve tlw administration of 
jnsti(·e." 'l'his is wholly beside the point. Ewn if we assume 
petitionu should have the bunlen of exeusing his failure to 
app('aJ', still it should be after affidayit and hearing beeause 
the basis of any exense for his eonclnd c·oulcl not be known to 
tl!C' <'Ourt. In fad no great burden is east upon the judge be-
eanse the fad ot the failure to appear vvould ordinarily not 
be disputable while the main issue, the existence of an excuse, 
\Hmlcl involn events a·way from the eourL In ltlein v. 
/'uited suzn·a, 1Gl F.2d 286, 288, the question pre-
st•lJted, I he same as here, was whethet· the failure of an 
at tol'lli'.Y to appear was direet or indireet eoutempt. The eourt 
llel d the c:ontem pt indired, stating: " ' ... The petitioner 
f eontenmor] himself was absent. His aets ad interim were 
likewise absent. His doings \vent with him. It would seem 
like an exquisite and palpable contradiction of terms to com-
plain in one breath that the petitioner [contemnor] and his 
Hets were absent, and in the next breath to say that sneh 
absenec c:onstituted a preo;cnre; that is, a contempt committed 
iu the presenee of the court.' " The sarne issue was presented 
in F:.1: parte Clark, 208 1\fo. 121 [106 S.W. 990, 997, 15 
LH. A .N.S. 389], and the same result reaehed and the eourt 
Jan. 1955] 
said: "The 
LYONS V. SUPERIOR COURT 
[43 C.2d 755; 278 P.2d 681] 
made and recited of the 
his intentional absence from the courtroom to the 
embarrassment of a trial in which the petitioner was 
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in counsel, 15 minutes at one time and 55 at another. The 
petitioner himself was absent. His acts ad interim were like-
wise absent. His doings went with him. It would seem like 
an exquisite and palpable contradiction of terms to 
in one breatl1 that the petitioner and his acts ·were 
in the next breath to say that such absence constituted a 
presence; that is, a contempt committed in the presence of the 
court. 'l'he absence of an attorney, a juryman, a witness, an 
officer (including even a member of the bench himself), from 
the courtroom at the precise time due there may be susceptible 
of many innocent explanations. Each and every one of these 
absences are of a kind and, hence on a level, and none of these 
explanations are ·within the mere eyesight or earshot of any 
court of ordinary mortal endowments. These explanations can 
only come to the court by evidence aliunde his eye or ear, so 
that it would seem that absence ought not to be dealt with 
as essentially in the same class as things that happen in the 
view or hearing of the court. We think that is the more 
gracious and the better view comporting with the good sense 
of the thing, comes well within the quoted definition of an 
indirect contempt, and is sustained by the reasoning of well-
considered cases." The same was held in 8tate v. Winthrop, 
148 Wash. 526 [269 P. 793, 795, 59 A.L.R. 1265], the court 
saying: "It is plain, we think, by this record, that appellant's 
conduct, viewed by the court as contemptuous, consisted in 
his inexcusable absence from the court when the case of 
Lynch v. Page was called for trial. vVe are unable to see how 
such absence on the part of appellant occnrred in the presence 
or view of the court." To the same effect is Ex parte Hill, 
122 Tex. 80 [52 S.W.2d 367, 368], \Vbere the court said: "It 
affirmatively appears therefrom that the district court has 
attempted to enter a summary :final order adjudging relator in 
(•ontempt for an allrged act of contempt, which, if it occurred 
at all, occnrrrd outside the presence of the court. It is true 
that the judgment recites 'said actions were committed and 
done in the presence of the Court,' etc., but the judgment also 
affirmatively shows that the offense relator was accused of was 
the act of being thirty minutes late in attending court. In 
other words, the alleged act of contempt was for being absent 
from court. Obviously the offense of being absent from court 
could not take place in the presence of the court. W c there-
766 LYONS v. SUPERIOR COURT [43 C.2d 
fore take it that the statement in the judgment to the effect 
that the occurred in the presence of the court is an 
erroneous conelusion not the facts found, 
but utterly repugnant thereto. 
"We do not think that the fact that when the relator 
did appear in court he attempted to offer the court an explana-
tion for his tardiness meets the rules of due process 
to the court power to punish him for '' 
.1.uuco•cou, where the question here has been 
involved and the matter discussed there is a unanimity of 
that the contempt is indirect. Yet this court 
chooses a contrary course without reason and in face of the 
principle that contempt is a serious matter and should not 
be dealt with summarily unless the conduct is clearly within 
the immediate view and presence of the court. It relies 
upon two cases, Ex parte Sternes, 77 Cal. 156 [19 P. 275, 11 
Am.St.Rep. 251], and In re Carr, 65 Cal.App.2d 681 [151 
P.2d 164], which do not involve the question here presented, 
are not in point and are of doubtful validity. In the Sternes 
case the person found guilty of contempt was a deputy sheriff 
who failed to produce his prisoner in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. The court was primarily concerned with whether 
he could attack the court's contempt judgment. There was 
a hearing on the very question of whether the deputy had the 
ability to produce the prisoner. The court said: "The first 
inquiry before the superior court upon the return made by 
the respondent Sternes [deputy] therein was to determine 
the issue as to whether said Ah Fong was or was not in his 
custody or under his control at the time of the issuance 
of or service of said writ upon him, said Sternes. It appears 
from the judgment that the judge proceeded to take testi-
mony as to said matter, and found as a fact that said Ah 
.B'ong was in the custody and under the control of said Sternes 
at the time of the issuance and service upon him of said writ, 
and that it was within the power of said Sternes to produce 
the body of said Ah Fong in obedience to the writ at the 
time of service of the writ upon him. This is the record of 
the court, acting within its legitimate powers, and that 
record must be considered as speaking the truth, and as 
conclusive until it has been in some way set aside or vacated.'' 
(Emphasis added.) While the court did thereafter say that 
the deputy's failure to produce the prisoner was a direct 
contempt, it did so for the reason that : ''An order to show 
cause or notice of a motion for an attachment would not have 
767 
of 
and thE' court was not in 
or misconstruction of the 
here a but so 
to the writ. 'l'he court 
~-·~~·~.·"·~~" to the issuance 
CHC;HCLlVU of the facts 
record to remain as it is, other courts must treat it as 
aetion of that eourt, and as conelusive upon all the matters 
decided it and essential to its judgment." pm·te 
st£pra, 77 Cal. 156, 163.) In other words, notice and 
were had. In the Carr case the order was for a 
mother to produce her child, and she had been so ordered 
while she was in eourt and the matter was continued at her 
Y'd'""w'" and aceordingly the District Court of Appeal stated: 
''. . . petitioner had an opportunity before the order was 
made to explain the reasons of her failure to obey" it. The 
real holding in those cases is that the requirement of an 
affidavit may be waived rather than that the contempt was 
direct. Such holding is, of course, contrary to the law. 
(Phillips v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.2d 256 [137 P.2d 838] ; 
Frowley v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. 220 [110 P. 817] ; In re 
Davis, 31 Cal.2d 451 [189 P.2d 283].) Moreover, it has been 
held that such eonduct is an indirect contempt. (In re Rose, 
90 Cal.App.2d 299 [202 P.2d 1064] ; Hughes v. Moncur, 28 
CaLApp. 462 [152 P. 968] .) 
'l'he subject has been analyzed : ''A direct contempt being 
an open insult to the person of the judges while presiding 
or a resistance to the powers of the court in its presence, 
while a construetive contempt is an act done, not in the 
presence of the court, but at a distance which resists the 
court's authority, as, for instance, disobedience to process or 
an order of the court such as tends in its operation to 
obstruct, interrupt, prevent, or embarrass the administration 
of jnstice. Direct contempts include only those aets of whieh 
the court itself has personal knowledge; which takes place in 
the presence of the court or so near physically as to impede 
the proceedings. Indirect contempts eonsist of all contemp-
tuous acts which occur out of the presence of the cmirt, and 
of which the court itself has no personal offieial knowledge. 
(Dangel, Contempt, § 14.) 
The majority opinion states: ''As expressly stated in the 
commitment the court did not-and it was not bound to-be-
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unsworn statement that he to appear 
the trial because he 
the very character and extent 
's derelictions as found in the commitment seem 
to indicate that perhaps his misconduct may have been con-
tributed to by illness of some form. Whether such miscon-
duct was on the one hand and maliciously eal-
c:nlated or, on the other hand was contributed to 
illness or other condition, is a matter of sub-
stantial moment to the petitioner and to the court." (Em-
added.) But it must be remembered that petitioner 
had no opportunity to present evidence in support of his 
excuse for being late. He had been found guilty of con-
tempt even b~ore he arrived in court after the noon recess. 
The situation would not have been different if petitioner had 
stated that his automobile had broken down on his way to 
court, or that the public transportation system, which he was 
using, failed to function. In either case, according to the 
majority view, the court was not bound to believe petitioner 
or accord him an opportunity to furnish proof of the truth 
of his statement. In other words, his mere absence from 
court at the time fixed for his appearance is conclusive proof 
of his guilt, and he is accorded no opportunity of showing that 
his failure to appear was wholly blameless. 
The situation here presents an ideal case for the applica-
tion of the rules which must be applied in cases of indirect 
contempt. The alleged contemptuous conduct does not take 
place in the presence or hearing of the court, and notice and 
hearing must therefore be had to give the court jurisdiction. 
Under the holding of the majority here, whenever an at-
torney is late for a court session, the judge can find him 
guilty of contempt and sentence him to five days in jail with-
out complaint, hearing or evidence, regardless of any excuse 
or justification the attorney may have to offer. In my opinion 
such a holding is out of harmony with both the statutes of 
this state and the great weight of authority in state and 
federal jurisdictions. 
For the foregoing reasons I would annul the judgment 
of contempt here imposed. 
Shenk, .T., and Traynor, .T., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied Feb-
ruary 10, 1955. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were 
of the opinion that the application should be granted. 
